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**THE RURAL FOUNDATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY:
TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MILITARY IN CHINA**

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

Scope of Study

The scope of this paper is to examine the relationship between society and the military in contemporary China using the data obtained from a field survey conducted by the author.¹

Since the military has played an important role in contemporary China, many studies on contemporary China, especially political studies, deal with the People's Liberation Army (referred to as the PLA hereinafter) in some way or other.² Previous literature on the PLA can be placed into three categories, as follows. The first category includes studies, which debate party-military relations and national defence policies from the viewpoint of political science/international relations.³ The second category includes studies that analyze the systems, organizations, formations, equipment, and strategies of the PLA from the viewpoint of narrow-sense military and security studies. The last category includes studies that analyze the role of the military in political processes during particular periods or events (e.g., the Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and so on) from the viewpoint of political science/political history.

This study differs from these previous studies in that it focuses on the society-military relations, that is to say, the mutual relations between the people and the military. In other words, this study is a social history of the military that examines the social foundation of the PLA during the Mao Zedong and Reform eras.⁴ The society-military relations in this sense can be considered largely under two conditions: in time of war or emergency (i.e. under martial law, coup d'état, etc.) and in peacetime. The main interest of this study is the latter. In the analysis of society-military relations in peacetime, the possible analytical points of view are as follows.

First is an analysis of the vector from military to society. For the military, the general public or civilians (*difang*, in Chinese military terms) is a source of human and material resources; therefore, the military needs to influence the general public systematically and ideologically, in order to obtain a certain level of social foundation. In the case of contemporary China, where "the political power was born from

guns,” the military has kept on functioning as a strong political symbol that demonstrates the Communist orthodoxy, and indoctrinates, as well as mobilizes, the people. For example, distinguishing traits of the Chinese military are the far-reaching militia system (the aspect of organizing and mobilizing the people), and the manipulation of the political icon of idealized soldier, Lei Feng (the aspect of indoctrination the people). In this sense, clarifying how the PLA approaches the society through the analyses of the militia and the “Learn-from-Lei Feng Campaign” can be a very beneficial analytical viewpoint of contemporary China.⁵

The second point of view is the analysis of the vector from society to military, the opposite of the above. In the case of a compulsory military service, it is unavoidable that changes in social conditions influence the military system through its soldiers. This is the reason why the military, regardless of the social system it is in, takes pains in the strict enforcement of discipline and education. Understanding China in its social upheaval process, analyzing how society influences the military, how the military deals with social changes and so on, provides a useful perspective. The candidates for these analyses include the attitudes of youths toward the military services, consciousness and behavioral patterns of soldiers in active military services, and the military authority’s policies on discipline enforcement and education/training.

The third point, related to the second, is to clarify what the military service means to the people socially or economically and what social status the military and the soldiers have. In other words, to evaluate the position of the military from the viewpoint of social mobility/stratification. In general, the military of a developing country also functions as a vocational training as well as educational body, and China is no exception. In addition, the PLA even has a unique tradition of productive activity engagement (so-called *sanda gongzuo* or “three big works” that means unification of fighting, production activities, and study). The trend of China moving into market-oriented economy is also thought to influence the social position of the military and the soldiers in some ways. From this point of interest, the possible examinations will be; the role of the military service in the career formation of peasants and city dwellers; the attitudes of youths toward the military services; the people’s assessment and image of the PLA (e.g., the position of soldiers in an occupational prestige evaluation); problems surrounding homecoming of veterans and their replacement.

The Five Social Booms

Among the above mentioned three analytical points of views, the third one will be used mainly in this paper. In order to accurately understand the position of the PLA in contemporary Chinese society, this kind of study

should be conducted further. With regard to society, I will focus on the peasants/rural society. This is because it is the rural society that the PLA has been cultivating to form a social foundation.

According to Xiao Qinfu et al., Chinese society has experienced five successive social booms since the middle of 1960's.⁶ The first boom was the "military-service boom" (*dangbing re*) or the "Green boom" (green is the colour of the military uniform) under the Cultural Revolution from the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's. Since the late 1970's, China entered into the Reform era and experienced its other four booms; the "entering-the-office boom" (*congzheng re*), the "winning-a-diploma boom" (*wenping re*), the "going-abroad-boom" (*chuguo re*), and the "doing-business boom" (*jingshang re*). Each boom was different from the other in its intensity depending on generation, social status, and area. For example, youth groups were the main players in the military-service boom and the going-abroad boom, while the entering-the-office-boom, the winning-a-diploma boom and the doing-business-boom engulfed middle or even advanced age groups. The entering-the-office boom, the winning-a-diploma boom, and the going-abroad-boom were morbidly popular among intellectuals, while the other two, especially the military-service boom, spread widely among people with low academic careers as well. The entering-the-office boom and the going-abroad-boom took place mainly in urban areas, while the other three spread in to rural areas also. Especially the military-service boom, which was centred in rural areas.

What is particularly interesting for the purpose of this paper is the fact that the military-service boom spread characteristically among young peasants with lower academic careers in the 1960's to 1970's.⁷ Needless to say, the social background at that period was the strict rural-urban divide by the institutional arrangements such as the household registration system and so on. For youths in rural areas during the Mao Zedong era, joining the PLA was one of the few chances to alter their status in the rural society, as well as a precious opportunity for education and vocational training.

Since the 1950's, when the conscription system was employed, the basic policy was that drafted soldiers ought to "go back to the place of recruitment" after retirement. After their retirement, most rural youths were sent back to rural areas. However, since they experienced an outside society, acquired skills difficult to obtain in a rural society, and established personal networks of "comrades," they formed a backbone in rural society. They took active parts in rural society as grassroots cadres, , managers or engineers/skilled workers for commune and brigade enterprises(*shedui qiye*), mechanics/electricians (such as agricultural machinery operators) and so forth. At the same time, there were small possibilities for veterans and their families to obtain urban household registrations by being fully employed in state owned enterprises or government

agencies in urban areas (*nongzhanfei*). This was especially true at the beginning of 1970's, when some provinces eased restrictions on changing household registration status. For example, in 1973, the Shandong Revolutionary Committee (*gemin weiyuanhui*) declared that the family members of a draftee hailing from a rural area were allowed to move into nearby cities and were given an urban household registration status, and that the draftee soldier himself also could get the same status after retirement.⁸ The military-service boom in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution era had a material foundation, as well as an ideological background.⁹

To sum up, from the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's, the Cultural Revolution era, there were two images of the PLA. One was an image as the existence rightfully succeeding the tradition of the rural revolution, which was emphasized for the purpose of indoctrination, as well as mobilization of the people. The other was an image as a means by which youths in rural areas could entrust their hope of a higher social status to. It can be said that these two images produced a synergy and caused the military-service boom in rural areas. Then how did the economic/social upheaval in rural areas in the Reform era influence the social foundation of the PLA in these same rural areas? This is the main question to be examined in this paper. The balance of the examination is as follows. First, an overview of the military service system and the conscription policies will be described. Next, the role of the military service in the career formation of peasants will be examined, using survey data of the peasant entrepreneurs after the Reform. Then, the attitude of peasants toward the military service will be analyzed, using factory surveys from Zhujiang Delta, Guangdong, and household surveys from Shandong, Hunan, and Anhui.

II. The Military Service System and Conscription Policy

The Military Service System

Presently, China employs a compulsory military system (*yiwn bingyi-zhi*).¹⁰ Therefore, all citizens have equal obligation for military service and in peacetime males of conscription age (eighteen to twenty two years old) are subject to conscription for active service. The Ministry of Defence has direct control over affairs related to the conscription, but it is the provincial military district (*junqu*) or military sub-district (*junfenqu*) and the People's Armed Forces Bureau (*renmin wuzhuang bu*) of the local government, which are responsible for actually operating as conscription administrative offices (*pingyi jiguan*). All the male citizens who will turn 18 before the end of the year ought to register for military service by the end of September and take the first examination for conscription. A conscription administrative office examines

successful candidates who have passed the first examination (draftable person, *yingzheng gongmin*) in the physical, as well as the political tests. This same office will then select recruits as so-called “pressed soldiers” (*yiwubing*) from those who have passed both tests. The terms of military service for pressed soldiers are prescribed as three years for army, four years for navy and air force, and five years maximum with an extension in active service. Some of pressed soldiers are selected to be “enlistees,” (*zhiyuambing*) i.e. occupational sergeants with special skills, after an extension of active service, but most of them retire and go back to the general public.

In the first half of the 1980’s, the PLA had a size of 4 million in all (for example, 4,238,000 in 1982). However, at the Central Military Commission Enlarged Meeting in June 1985, the decision of a 1 million cut-down was reached (according to the census in 1990, the number of soldiers in active service was 3,199,100). In the first half of the 1990’s, the population in the conscription age stratum numbered approximately 50 million, of which hundreds of thousand soldiers were drafted to active service each year.¹⁰ It is safe to regard this number as an approximate conscription ratio since the latter half of the 1980’s.

Table 1 summarizes the receiving status of veterans in Zhejiang Province in 1989 and 1994, as an example of the status at province/district level. As veterans are basically obliged to go back to their places of recruitment, it is possible to read the number of veterans returned as the number of soldiers drafted for active service. The number of veterans in the province in 1994 was 18,317, which is around 1 percent of the male population at conscription age in the province; this number supports the above-mentioned conscription scale in the whole country.¹¹ From Table 1, the rural-urban social mobility through the military service can also be observed. Among the males drafted from rural areas, only 3 percent were “placed” in urban (*chengzhen*) areas in 1989, and in 1994 all veterans of rural origin went back to rural areas¹².

Even though the compulsory military service system is employed, the conscription rate of the PLA is low, and only few in an age group serve in the military for any given period of time. In this sense, the relations between the PLA, “people’s army,” and the general masses were not always very close in peacetime. This characteristic causes the appearance of the society-military relations to seem extreme. That is to say, at one time, during the military-service boom, the military was seen among people as a rare chance to advance themselves, and at another time, the military became an existence alienated from the people.

Conscription Policy

With regard to the conscription policy of the PLA, the main points can be summarized as follows.

First, in the Mao Zedong era, the main body of the PLA has been the rural youths of good class background (*mostly pinxiazhongnong*, “poor and hired peasant”). Table 2 summarizes the number of drafted soldiers and their characteristics in Shandong from 1954 to 1987, and it clearly shows the rural-oriented conscription policy. The only exception was the beginning of the 1960’s. For the purpose of relaxation during a period of employment tension and food shortage in urban areas caused by the devastating setback of the Great Leap Forward (*dayuejin*) policy, a large military-service campaign was carried out in urban areas at that time.^{1 3}

Second, the rural-oriented conscription policy has been maintained after the 1980’s. However, how household registration status is taken into account in the selection of conscripts differs from province to province. In the case of Hubei Province, it was the policy in the first half of the 1980’s that the number of draftees with urban household registration was limited to 15 percent or less.^{1 4} According to the population census in 1990, the ratio of urban registration holders in the male population of the province was approximately 21percent.^{1 5}

It can be said that this policy was aimed at controlling the conscription of males with urban household registrations. The reason for this is that when administrative responsibilities involved, such as drafting and replacement after retirement (*anzhi gongzuo*, “placement policy”) are compared, drafting urban household registration holders puts more burden on the government than drafting rural household registration holders. Therefore, the provincial government relied on rural areas as inexpensive sources of soldiers even in the Reform era. On the other hand, in Zhejiang Province, the ratio of veterans of urban origin was 28.2 percent in 1994. This was not less than the population ratio with urban household registrations in the whole population; in this case, the tendency to conscript more applicants from rural areas is not observed (Table 1). This difference can be explained by the disparity in the financial power of local government between Hubei and Zhejiang.

Third, after the 1980’s, the class background criterion had been taken over by the educational background criterion. The reasons for this are, on the one hand, the transition from revolutionism (*hong*) to professionalism (*zhuan*) of the PLA (*xiandaihua*, “Modernization”) and the need for more educated soldiers, and on the other hand, the significance of the “class line”(*jieji luxian*) principle had diminished in the

socio-political sphere as a whole. After the 1980's, the basic academic qualification for draftees was above middle school level in rural areas, and above high school in urban areas¹⁶.

Fourth, as an indispensable part of the conscription system, placement policy, handsome treatment for soldiers' families (*youdai gongzuo*) and policy for support of disabled soldiers/families (*wuxu gongzuo*) had been employed. As above-mentioned, veterans with rural household registrations typically go back to rural areas, at which point, the township governments in the area of recruitment are expected to take care of their replacement and overall living (Article 56 of the Military Service Act). At the same time, to the family of a soldier in active service, the township government gives preferential treatment based on the standards set by the government body at province level. However, these preferential policies are only nominal in many cases, especially for the soldiers/veterans in rural areas. For example, in the Cultural Revolution era, a considerable number of rural veterans in Shandong Province made protestations about the bad treatment that they received.¹⁷ This is partly because of the lean budgets of the local governments, but mainly because of the pro-urban bias of the local governments. For the party/state system in the Mao Zedong era, peasants have been the most inexpensive resource ready to mobilize, and soldiers from rural areas were not the exception.

III. Career Formation of Peasants and the Military Service

The significance of the military service in the vertical social mobility is examined here. Specifically employment in township and village enterprises (TVE), rural cadres, and peasant entrepreneurs are taken for example.

The "Person of Military and Civil Life Talent"

The "Person of Military and Civil Life Talent" (*jun-di liangyong rencai*, means personnel with skills useful both in military and in the general public, hereinafter PMCLT) training is a policy, which has been in use since the 1980's. Its purpose is to enhance the social/economic value of military service. The total number of 6,500,000 people in the entire army has received the PMCLT education/training since the 1980's. In total, by the end of 1989, 2,280,000 PMCLT soldiers with rural household registrations have retired. Among them, 400,000 (18 per cent) became cadres of township level and 500,000 (22 per cent) were employed by the TVE sector.¹⁸ In Shandong province, by the end of 1987, the total number of PMCLT who received job referrals by local governments was 104,000. 32,200 (31 percent) of them became township and village cadres, 36,500 (35 percent) entered into the TVE sector, 14,800 (14 percent) became the "specialized household" (*zhuanyehu*) of agriculture or owners of individual/home enterprise (*getihu*), and 7,463 were absorbed by the

SOE sector.¹⁹

Let me add similar data of province and city level. In Jiangxi Province, the bureau of civil affairs accepted 36,400 PMCLT with rural household registrations during the period from 1983 to 1990, and among them, 29,100 found employment with the systematic help of employment offices. The breakdown is 6,800 as executives of TVE's (1,300 as managers and 1,200 as skilled workers) and 6,500 as the specialized households of agriculture. Since the total number of demobilized soldiers and veterans in rural areas in Jiangxi was 500 thousand-plus, the 36,400 people of military and civil life talent made up approximately 7 percent of them.²⁰ In addition, in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, the bureau of civil affairs established the "Person of Military and Civil Life Talent employment office" in March 1984 and helped 7,833 people find employment for two years from 1984 to 1985. Veterans with rural household registrations obtained urban household registration status as "supply own grain household registration" (*zili kouliang hukou*) and, as a policy, employed as contract workers (*hetonggong*) on 5 to 10 year contracts at enterprises and bodies in Wuhan city or district/suburban county (typically employed as drivers, cooks, machinery repairman, and so on). The break down of these 7,833 is: 1) 1,268 in the enterprises/bodies in Wuhan City, 2) 1,036 in the enterprises/bodies belonging to district/suburban counties, 3) 3,576 in TVE's, 4) 587 as grassroots cadres of townships and villages, and 5) 1,366 in the commerce and service sector (most of them are probably self-employed). The breakdown by household registration status is unknown, but 3) to 5) are basically veterans with rural household registrations and 1) and 2) also include them.²¹

The Carrier Formation of Peasant Entrepreneurs

Table 3 shows the carrier formation of individual business owner (*getihu*) and private enterprise manager (*siying qiyejia*) with rural household registrations (referred to as the peasant entrepreneur collectively hereinafter), using a nation-wide sample survey.²² The following points can be noted from Table 3-a.

First, soldier (military service) has become an important career as village cadre and for administrative positions in TVE's. Especially, for people with career experience as soldiers account for 7.2 percent of private enterprise managers while the conscription rate is only around 1 percent as mentioned earlier. Veterans tend to establish their own businesses after the retirement using the skills, experiences, and human networks they obtained through the military service as management resources. This indicates a path of career formation and social mobility. The importance of military experience for peasant entrepreneurs

becomes clearer if compared with that in urban areas. According to the results of a sample survey of private enterprise managers (n = 271) conducted in downtown Beijing at the beginning of the 1990's, none of them had any experience in the military.^{2 3}

Second, people who had careers which form the backbone of rural societies, such as village cadres and administrative positions in TVE's, account for 13.8 percent of the total samples and account for 47.7 percent, almost half of the private enterprise managers in particular. This is a distinguishing characteristic of rural areas. In urban areas, particularly in the beginning of the Reform era, alienated groups shunned by government owned sectors such as "sent-down youth" (*xiafang zhiqing*) who returned to urban areas, and urban unemployed youth (*daiye gingnian*, "youths waiting for jobs") etc. accounted for a relatively large percentage of the business owners/managers.^{2 4}

Third, job experiences outside the home village (as temporary workers, contract workers) are also significant as a careers that enable peasants to have experiences outside of rural society and to acquire special skills and knowledge.

Table 4 shows the career histories of peasant entrepreneurs in detail in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang province, using data collected by the author in the summer of 1993. Known as the "Wenzhou Merchants," many youths are engaged in individual commerce and industry in the rural areas of Wenzhou.^{2 5} This table summarizes the career formation processes of 17 entrepreneurs with rural household registration status.

Four in 17 people have experience in the military service, which indicates the same point that Table 3 does. In this sense, No. 9, who went through career changes from soldier to grassroots cadre to entrepreneur, is the most typical. Similar characteristics are also seen in a sample survey of rural traders and business owners (*gongxiaoyuan*) in nine counties conducted by Wenzhou City authorities in the latter half of the 1980's. According to the study, the careers which the samples had were: 20 in 147 (13.6 percent) were former village cadres, and 19 (12.9 percent) were veterans.^{2 6}

Economic Reform and the Significance of Military Service

To sum up the above discussion, it can be concluded that, before and after the Reform, the military service continued to play a significant role in professional career formations for rural youths. However, taking the

increased household income, enlarged socioeconomic opportunities, and the increased social mobility into consideration after the Reform, the following can be hypothesized on the significance of the military service.

1) The significance of the Military as educational/vocational training for rural youths has been diminishing since the Reform. This, combined with the subsiding revolutionary ideology after the Reform, affects the peasant's attitude toward the PLA.

2) Such tendencies will differ depending upon the region. In general, the better the non-farming job opportunities and income in the area are, the more negative the attitude of rural youths is toward the Military. In other words, the strength of the PLA's social foundation in rural areas is negatively correlated with the overall level of economic development and marketization of the region.

With this hypothesis in mind, let us have a look at Table 3 again. Table 3-B summarizes the career formation of peasant entrepreneurs by age. The ratio of people without any specific experience mentioned here is zero percent for 55 years or older. However, as the age decreases the ratio increases, and it reaches 36 percent in the less than 35 years old group. This indicates that for people of middle or advanced age who started to form professional careers before the Reform, such specific experiences were significant to acquire skills and experience to start businesses; while younger generations received benefits from larger socioeconomic opportunities after the Reform.²⁷

With regard to military experience, the oldest stratum (over 55 years old) has the highest proportion of people having military experience. Most of them are considered to have retired in the 1950's. This reflects the historical background of rural China in that most of the soldiers who retired during this period have been absorbed into the grassroots party-administrative apparatuses and economic entities such as the community/brigade enterprises, and have formed the backbone of rural society. It is notable that, contrary to the village cadre experience, other age strata have almost the same proportions of military experience. This can be partly explained by the above-mentioned efforts of the PLA and the Ministry of Civil Affairs to give soldiers the PMCLT training and so forth.

Stating the above hypothesis in another way, after the Reform, the tendency was that youths in rural areas began to evaluate military service based on an objective comparison with other social/economic opportunities. It was Lin Renle and Yan Fuchun who pointed this out directly.²⁸ According to them, recently, many soldiers with rural household registrations began to have clear professional consciousness, which has not been observed before. They strongly wish to have better jobs in rural areas after retirement, and they also think that the government should support them by adopting appropriate policies as well as by

providing financial support. Their study classifies the intentions of veterans with rural household registrations as follows: First, most of the soldiers who joined the party during active service and were promoted to squad leader class desire to become village cadres or to be employed by SOE's at county level. Soldiers who acquired special skills during the service generally do not wish to engage in farming in their hometowns, but would rather leave agriculture (*tiao mongmen*) to start their own businesses in commerce or the service industry in urban areas (mostly in small/medium cities near home). Furthermore, unmarried soldiers strongly hope to work in TVE's or work outside without going back to farming. Also, according to a related survey conducted by a certain squad, among its 360 new conscripts, 235 answered "I would like to acquire driving skills" and 78 answered "I would like to learn machine repairing skills".²⁹

IV. Peasants and Military in Contemporary China: A View from Field Survey

In this section, the hypothetical summary mentioned at the end of the previous section will be tested against data obtained from field surveys. The discussion will be opened with problems caused by military service mobilization in the 1980's by going back to the Wenzhou case. Then, the data obtained from the field survey will be examined. First, the expectation of peasants for their children's future will be investigated using the farm household surveys conducted by the author in Shandong, Hunan, and Anhui provinces. Secondly, the attitudes of rural youths toward military service will be discussed based on factory survey data in Zhujiang Delta, Guangdong Province.

"Conscription Trouble" in Wenzhou

It is reported that a tendency to evade military service spread in rural areas along the coastal provinces of areas such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong etc. after the 1980's.

For example, in a certain county in Wenzhou, 42 percent of the conscription subjects were absent from the examination, even at the cost of the fines.³⁰ Because of this, Wenzhou city authorities made a practical measure to collect compulsory military service fees from people of military age who are exempted and to appropriate them for the source of revenue for increasing the pay of recruits from 1988.³¹ In Wenzhou, the "doing-business boom" replaced the "military-service boom" after the Reform. As mentioned above, it is quite common for young peasants in Wenzhou to travel back and forth to work. It is considered that for youths in this kind of socioeconomic environment, the importance of military service was lowered

considerably with regard to career formation. In Table 4, it is seen that the majority of the people with military service served in the 1970's. This fact may be the cause of the current social situation.

Examining Table 1 once again after noting this fact, one should notice that the ratio of rural household registration holders in veterans in Wenzhou district is very low compared to that of Zhejiang Province as a whole. It is natural to conclude that this ratio reflects the "conscription trouble" phenomenon in rural areas of Wenzhou, because it is difficult to assume that more urban household registration holders were intentionally conscripted in Wenzhou only.

In examining the "conscription trouble" in developed coastal areas, changes in the family structure--reductions in the size of households, an increase of the number of nuclear families and a decrease of number of children--caused by the family planning policy and other factors should be taken into consideration. In general, a decrease in the number of children will have a negative effect on people's attitudes toward conscription. Since the family planning policy is more strictly enforced in developed districts on the coast than in the inland areas, the changes in the family structure in rural areas on the coast explains, in part, the reasons for the conscription trouble.

Expectation of Peasants for Children

Then, what is the situation in rural China as a whole? Although there is no nationwide data that directly illustrates the attitude of rural youths toward military service, a survey on social consciousness of farm household heads at the Ministry of Agriculture Regular Rural Observation Station (*nongcun guding guanchadian*) is to be of use. Table 6 summarizes the expectation of farm household heads for the future of their children (hereafter referred to as expectation for children). The highest was 42 percent and the expectation was for their children to "Enter universities and become state cadres", followed by "worker," "farmer" and "the PLA" in this order. It seems that military service as a career still has value for peasants. It is the relationship between expectation for children and household characteristics in this survey data that are interesting for the point of view of this paper. However only the aggregate data is available.

Therefore, the author conducted a multiple correspondence analysis using original household survey data in three administrative villages in Anqiu County, Shandong Province, Yongxing County, Hunan Province, and Tianchang County, Anhui Province (100 household village per survey). These are the villages with lower middle (Yongxing) to upper middle (Anqiu and Tianchang) economic development levels, Expectation for children is classified into five occupational statuses: farming (*wunong*), engineer/technician

(*zhuan ye jishi ren yuan*), township and village cadres (*xiang cun gan bu*), the PLA (*jun ren*), and other occupations. Figure 1 summarizes the outcomes. Appended to the figure is the list of categorical variables used. Category scores (column coordinates) of dimension 1, 2, and 3 are illustrated in the order of contribution to the eigenvalues (principal inertia). Each dimension can be interpreted based on the size of the range (the difference between maximum and minimum scores) of each category score. The cumulative contribution of the three dimensions was 39 percent, which is not high enough to reach a distinct conclusion. However, in order to find clues for more detailed examination for the future, we undertook tentative interpretations as follows^{3 2}.

In dimension 1, which has the highest contribution, the categories that have the widest ranges are village dummy and attitude toward non-farm economic activities, household income structure, and satisfaction in agriculture. On the positive side: negative attitude toward non-farm economic activities, higher agricultural income ratio, and low satisfaction in agriculture. On the negative side: positive attitude toward non-farm economic activities, lower agricultural income ratio, and high satisfaction in agriculture. Dimension 1 can be understood as an axis that describes the household's attitude to economic activities and household income structure. Agriculture-oriented attitude/income structure is positioned on the positive side while Non-agricultural oriented attitude/income structure is positioned on the negative side. Dimension 2 can be regarded as an axis that illustrates individual characteristics of household heads because the range of age and educational background is wide. Lower educational background and middle or advanced age group is positioned on the positive side while high educational background and youth group is positioned on the negative side. In dimension 3, the categories with wide ranges are daily activity domain, urban-orientation, household income structure, and the attitude toward non-farm economic activities. On the negative side, a wide range of daily activity and high urban-orientation are positioned, and their opposites are positioned on the positive side. It is difficult to interpret but it can be thought of as an axis that shows the social activeness of household heads.

Before a discussion on the outcomes, let us have a look at the positioning of three villages.^{3 3} Along dimension 1, Tianchang and Yongxing are positioned on the positive side while Anqiu is positioned on the negative side. In Anqiu, a considerable part of the male key labor force are absorbed into the collectively owned/operated TVE sector. As a pure agricultural region in inland China, Yongxing has the highest proportion of labor force involved mainly in farming activities. Very few are in the collective sector, and little outside-township employment was observed. Tianchang, located behind Yangzhou, Yizheng and

Nanjing, is one of the nation's grain production bases. Recently, livestock farming and fishery targeted urban markets have become active and dependency on agriculture is higher than Anqiu. Unlike Anqiu, the TVE sector is not as developed there, and many villagers are temporarily working away from the village in the slack season. Therefore, the positioning approximately reflects the villages' economic structures.

Now, with regard to the positioning of expectation for children, in the coordinates of the first and second dimensions, township and village cadres and engineer/technician are in contrast; the former is on the positive side while the latter is on the negative side of dimension 1. This suggests that relatively conservative household heads who have negative feelings toward non-farming economic activity have relatively positive orientation toward political status. This may not be irrelevant to the strong orientation toward official posts (*guan*) rooted in the political culture of rural tradition. On the contrary, household heads that have positive attitudes toward non-farm economic activities seem to have a strong orientation toward skills and knowledge, and prefer engineer/technician. Farming is positioned on the positive side in dimension 2, which is interpreted as a negative choice correlated with advance in age and lower educational background.^{3 4}

Then, what is the positioning of the PLA? It is on the negative side of dimension 3, which seems to be correlated with high educational background, youth group, and positive attitudes toward non-farm economic activities; higher proportion of non-farm income, wide daily activity domain, and strong urban-orientation. From this positioning of the PLA, it can be concluded that the PLA as a professional career still has a certain positive importance in our survey villages. For it is correlated with the orientation toward non-farm activities and intensity of social activeness. The implication of this result is that military service still has some positive meaning for peasants in rural areas at the middle development level. This fact finding supports in the above-mentioned hypothesis.

Rural Youths' Attitude toward the Military Service

The foregoing is data on the consciousness of household heads. It is necessary to see the attitude of rural youths that are the actual subjects of conscription. Since there is no comprehensive data, I will use a factory survey conducted by the author in three Japanese invested electric factories in Zhujiang (Pearl River) Delta, Guangdong Province, in 1994 and 1997 (the total sample size is 483, 162 male, and 321 female).^{3 5} Almost all the workers are young migrant workers from inland rural areas (mountainous areas in Guangdong, and other neighboring provinces such as Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Guangxi and so on). Let us examine the attitude

of male workers by conducting a logit estimation on the relations between the attitude toward military service and the worker's characteristics. The age range of male workers is from 18 to 40 (23 years old in average), and the range of educational background is from primary school or below (1 per cent), middle school level (50 percent), high school or vocational school level (46 percent), above high school level (3 percent). In this estimation, the attitude toward military service is the dependent variable, and it is described by a dummy variable: either wishing (=1) or not wishing (=0) to become a PLA soldier. The explanatory variables which relate to the worker's characteristics are as follows: age (years), education (1=primary school level or below, 2=middle school level, 3=high school or vocational school level, 4=above high school), location of the home village (the distance from county seat, by km). Age is expected to negatively correlate with the attitude toward the PLA. Education, as the proxy of human capital, indicates the accessibility to good socioeconomic opportunities. Therefore, the effect of education is expected to be negative. The location of the home village represents environmental conditions (transportational and informational disadvantages, disadvantage in the development of TVE and so forth). The effect of location is expected to be positive because the further a village away from nearby cities, the more difficulties the villagers face in accessing good employment opportunities.

The result of estimation is shown in Table 5. The effects of three explanatory variables are as follows: negative (age), negative (education), and positive (location), which was expected. Although the significance level is low (10 percent for Education, over 10 percent for Location), the result implies a negative correlation between the accessibility to socioeconomic opportunities that were opened after the Reform, and a peasant's attitude toward the PLA.

V. Conclusion

The main points of this paper are summarized as follows:

(1) In the Mao Zedong era, the political image of the PLA, people's armed forces that exemplify the tradition of rural revolution, was used as a strong means for indoctrination and mobilization of the masses. For youths in rural areas, the PLA was one of the few channels in which they could entrust their desire for vertical (upward) social mobility. In the mid-1960's to mid-1970's, these two images of the PLA --- the symbol of revolution, the symbol of vertical social mobility--- had created a synergy and brought about the

“military-service boom” in rural areas. In this context, it can be concluded that the PLA in the Mao Zedong era had a firm social foundation in rural areas, both materially and ideologically.

(2) In the Reform era, the significance of the PLA as a political icon faded because of the decline of ideology in general and the development of the PLA’s “modernization” line. On the other hand, the marketization of rural economy changed the social and economic meaning of the Military. In developed rural areas, that experienced rapid growth in income level and enlargement of socioeconomic opportunities, “conscription trouble” arose, and it seemed that the PLA’s rural foundation was shaken. However, from the data obtained by the author’s field survey, it is suggested that military service still holds some importance in rural areas at the middle development level.

(3) Hypothetically speaking, in amplification of the discussions in this paper, the following points concerning the society-military relations can be raised. The military not only ruled politically but also markedly infiltrated into the general public in the Mao Zedong era. Especially, in the Cultural Revolution era, the infiltration of the military into the general public appeared in the forms of military control of work places and schools in cities, the activity of work teams that include soldiers as the core members in rural areas^{3 6}, and the aforementioned “military-service boom”. On the other hand, the opposite vector, infiltration of social changes into the military, is the distinguishing characteristic in the Reform era. Other than the problems surrounding conscription and retirement mentioned above, relaxation of discipline of soldiers in active service (passivity toward military training, working part time outside barracks, bribery for assignment to advantageous posts, etc.) has become a big problem.^{3 7} Even though the PLA seems to have a firm organizational characteristics at a glance, these problems coupled with the military’s commencement of various business (the “doing-business boom” in the military itself), may have been giving rise to significant changes in its organization that are hard to see from the surface.

(4) The main purpose of this paper is to propose new analytical viewpoints concerning the society-military relations in contemporary China, and to attempt several analyses based on rural survey data. Several issues require further examination; the PLA’s social foundation in urban areas; the effect of the change in family structure on the people’s attitude toward the military; ;a comparison with the negative images on soldiers in traditional society. These points should be examined in the future toward the social history of the military in contemporary China.

¹ This paper constitutes one of the wholly revised and extended versions of my previous papers; "Income Generation and Access to Economic Opportunities in a Transitional Economy: A Comparative Analysis of Five Chinese Villages," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics*, Vol. 39, no. 2 (December, 1998), pp. 1-18; "Market Conversion in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province," *China Newsletter*, no.112 (October, 1994), pp. 6-16; "Chugoku Jinmin Kaihougun no Nouseiteki Kiban" ("The Rural Foundation of the PLA"), *Aziya kenkyu*, Vol. 43, no. 2 (July, 1997), pp. 1-34; "Development and Culture in Coastal China: Job-finding, Factory Life, and Social Consciousness of Migrant Workers," Discussion Paper Series, no. 1998-12, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 1998, pp. 1-16. The work for this paper was partly supported by the grants of the Ministry of Education of Japan [No.09490013, No.08208101].

² Recent studies on the PLA are, for example, Shigeo Hiramatsu, *Tou Shouhei no Gunji Kaikaku (The Military Reform by Deng Xiaoping)* (Tokyo: Keisou-shobou, 1989); Shigeo Hiramatsu, *Zoku Tou Shouhei no Gunji Kaikaku (The Military Reform by Deng Xiaoping [continuance])* (Tokyo: Keisou-shobou, 1990); Kouzou Kawashima, *Chugoku Tou-gun Kankei no Kenkyu (A Study of Party-military relations in China)* (Tokyo: Keio-tsushin, 1988); Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang (eds.), *China's Military in Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Zhu Fang, *Gun Barrel Politics: Party Army Relations in Mao's China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

³ The most legitimate study on the military as a political science study is on civil-military relations. In dealing with civil-military relations, the popular frame of reference is that, in the modernization process, civil politics (civilians) and the military are separated both in their positions in the institutional arrangements and in their roles in political processes. See, Nihon Seiji Gakkai [Japan Political Science Society] ed., *Kindaika-katei ni okeru Sei-gun Kankei (Civil-military Relations in the Modernization Process)* (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1989). In case of China, it can be replaced by party-military relations. One of the newest studies on civil-military relations in this sense is Diamond and Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), which examines and compares civil-military relations in developing countries and post-socialist states.

⁴ In discussing the view-points in this paper, the author obtained many suggestions from series of studies by the members of Gendaishi no kai (Contemporary History Society), Tokyo; Tadatoshi Fujii, "Heishi: Guntai ni Douin sareta

Minshuu" ("Soldier: The Drafted People"), *Kikan Gendaihi*, No.4, (1974), pp. 5-23, Tadatoshi Fujii , *Kokubou Fujinkai (Women's Voluntary Service)* (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten , 1985) , Tadatoshi Fujii, Hiroyuki Shiraishi, Yasue Ohki, and Michiko Yamanishi, " Sougou Kenkyu Zaigou Gunjin Kai Shi Ron"("Comprehensive Study of the Veterans Association in Pre-war Japan") , *Kikan Gendaihi*, No.9, (1978).

⁵ On the history of "Learn-from-Lei Feng Campaign", see, for example, Liu Qucai, Wang Shaohua, and Fan Shuping, *Zhongguo Xue Lei Feng Yundong 30 nian Jianshi (30 Years of the "Learn-from-Lei Feng" Campaign)* (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1991).

⁶ Xiao Qinfu et al., *Wuci Langchao (The Five Booms)*(Beijing: Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1989).

⁷ "Peasant" here is defined by the household registration status, that is to say, a rural household registration holder.

⁸ Shandong-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), *Shandong-Shengzhi: Minzheng-zhi (Gazetteer of Shandong Province: Civil Affairs)* (Jinan: Shandong Remnin Chubanshe, 1992), pp. 108-109.

⁹ At the same time, it occurred corresponding to the tremendous increase in the number of soldiers in this era.

¹⁰ "Tuiwu-anzhi Gongzuo de Yixiang Zhongyao Gaige" ("An Important Reform of the Placement Policy for Veterans"), *Zhongguo Minzheng*, no. 10 (October, 1993), p. 5.

¹¹ *Zhejiang Tongji Nianjian 1995 (Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook 1995)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1996), p. 37. *Zhongguo 1990 nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Data Book of the 1990 Population Census)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1993), vol. 1, p. 2.

¹² It is not clear whether this figure of "placement" in urban areas includes transfer as "supply own grain" household registration (*zili kouliang hukou*) approved after 1984, in which case a person's household registration is transferred to a small city and one settles down there without the right to food, housing, or social security.

¹³ Shandong-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui ed., *Shandong-Shengzhi: Junshi-zhi (Gazetteer of Shandong Province: Military)* (Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 177-180.

¹⁴ Yu lin, "Anzhi-zhengce Gaige Fen Liangbuzou" ("Dual-truck policy in the Reform of the Placement for Veterans") *Zhongguo Minzheng*, no. 8 (August, 1994), p. 25

¹⁵ *Zhongguo 1990 nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao*, p. 8.

¹⁶ Fujian-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), *Fujian-Shengzhi: Junshi (Gazetteer of Fujian Province: Military)* (Beijing: Xinghua Chubanshe, 1995), p. 329.

¹⁷ Shandong-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), *Shandong-Shengzhi: Junshi-zhi*, p. 192.

¹⁸ *Zhongguo Minzheng*, no. 1 (1991), p. 37.

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- ¹⁹ Shandong-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), *Shandong-Shengzhi: Minzheng-zhi*, p. 110.
- ²⁰ Zheng Bulin, "Liangyong Rencai Kaifashiyong yu Nongcun Shehui Jingji Fazhan" ("Utilization of the Military and Civil Life Talent and the Rural Socioeconomic Development"), *Zhongguo Minzheng*, no. 5 (May, 1991), p. 22.
- ²¹ Wuhan Minzheng-zhi Bianzuan Bangongshi (ed.), *Wuhan Minzheng 1840-1985 (Civil Affairs in Wuhan: 1840-1985)* (Wuhan: Wuhan Minzheng-zhi Bianzuan Bangongshi, 1987), pp. 163-164.
- ²² Guojia Tizhi-gaige Weiyuanhui and Guojia Gongshang-ju (eds.), *Zhongguo Geti Siying Jingji Diaocha* (Survey on Individual and Private Economy in China) (Beijing: Junshi-yiwen Chubanshe, 1993). This survey was conducted from January 1991 to early 1992. The 51,601 samples (48,400 for individual business and 3,201 for private enterprise) were taken from the Business Registration by Industry and Commerce Administration Department in seven big cities.
- ²³ Jia ting and Qin Shaoxiang, *Shehui Xinqunti Tanmi: Zhongguo Siyingqiyezhu Jiecheng* (An Analysis of the New Social Group: Private Enterprise Manager in China) (Beijing: Fazhan Chubanshe, 1993), p. 55.
- ²⁴ In this nationwide survey, 33.7 percent of owners/managers who have business registrations in urban areas (including county seats) are "waiting for jobs". Guojia Tizhi-gaige Weiyuanhui and Guojia Gongshang-ju (eds.), *Zhongguo Geti Siying Jingji Diaocha*, pp. 124, 348.
- ²⁵ On the economic characteristics of Wenzhou, see Sato, "Market Conversion in Wenzhou", pp. 6-8, Liu, Yialing, "Reform from Below: The Private Economy and Local Politics in the Rural Industrialization of Wenzhou, *China Quarterly*, no. 130 (June, 1992), pp. 293-316.
- ²⁶ Zhang Renshou and Li Hong, *Wenzhou Moshi Yanjiu (A Study on the Wenzhou Model)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 113-115.
- ²⁷ Concerning this point, another interesting fact is that the number of people who have experiences as village cadres, gradually decreases as the age decreases, while the ratios of working away from home, namely job experience outside the village, gradually increase as the age decreases.
- ²⁸ Lin Renle and Yan Fuchun, "Tuiwu-junren XinliTedian ji AnzhiDuice" ("The Psychological Characteristics of Veterans and Replacement Policy"), *Zhongguo Minzheng*, no. 3 (March, 1992), p. 20.
- ²⁹ Gu Jieshan, Liu Jixing et al. (eds.), *Dandai Zhongguo Shehui Liyi Qunti Fenxi (An Analysis of the Interest Groups in Contemporary China)* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 410-411.
- ³⁰ Xiao Qinfu et al., *Wuci Langchao*, p. 33.
- ³¹ Hiramatsu, *Zoku Tou Shouhei no Gunji Kaikaku*, pp. 128-129.

^{3 2} Multiple Correspondence Analysis (or Quantification Theory) is applicable to categorical data set without specific a dependent variable. It sorts variables (questions) and samples by patterns by giving points depending on the samples' response to each question. On the theory of Multiple Correspondence Analysis see Tsutomu Komazawa, *Suryouka Riron to De-ta Syori (Quantification Theory and Data Processing)* (Tokyo: Asakura-shoten, 1982), SAS Institute Inc. , *SAS/STAT User's Guide*, Version 6 (Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc, 1990). Eigenvalues and contribution for each dimension were: 0.2171 and 15.1 percent for dimension 1, 0.1786 and 12.4 percent for dimension 2, and 0.1658 and 11.5 percent for dimension 3. The figures of category scores and ranges are omitted here due to space limitations.

^{3 3} For a detailed discussion of the survey design and characteristics of data collected, see Sato, "Income Generation", and Katsuji Nakagane(ed.), *Kaikaku igo no Chugoku Nousei Shakai to Keizai (Society and Economy of Rural China after Reform)*(Tokyo: Tsukuba-Shobou, 1997), pp.19-31. This rural household survey was conducted in 1992(Anqiu and Yongxing) and 1993 (Tianchang) by the Chino-Japan joint research team headed by Professor Katsuji Nakagane, University of Tokyo.

^{3 4} Various occupational prestige surveys also suggest a low evaluation of farming. For example, according to a survey conducted in eight provinces (671 samples) in 1990, "farmer" was second to "priests" as the worst among 16 occupations. See Gu jieshan and Liu Jixing et al. (eds.), *Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Liyi Qunti Fenxi*, p. 487.

^{3 5} For details of this factory survey, see Sato, "Development and Culture".

^{3 6} For example, see Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village under Mao and Deng* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 129-130.

^{3 7} See, Hiramatsu, *Zoku Tou Shouhei no Gunji Kaikaku* , Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 1. Conscription and "Placement" of Soldiers in Zhejiang Province (1989, 1994)

Place of Conscription			"Placement" status		Ratio of rural origin soldiers	Ratio of rural household registration
a) Total number of veterans	b) Rural (nongcun) (b/a, %)	c) Urban (chengzhen) (c/a, %)	d) Went back to rural areas (d/a, %)	e) Be placed in urban areas (e/a, %)	who went back to rural areas (d/b, %)	holders in the total population (%)
1989						
Provincial Total	14,345 (100.0)	12,087 (84.3)	2,258 (15.7)	11,710 (81.6)	2,635 (18.4)	96.9
Hangzhou city	2,541 (100.0)	2,203 (86.7)	338 (13.3)	2,135 (84.0)	406 (16.0)	96.9
Wenzhou city	1,160 (100.0)	666 (57.4)	494 (42.6)	646 (55.7)	514 (44.3)	97.0
Lishui district	689 (100.0)	589 (85.5)	100 (14.5)	572 (83.0)	117 (17.0)	97.1
1994						
Provincial Total	18,317 (100.0)	13,151 (71.8)	5,166 (28.2)	13,151 (71.8)	5,166 (28.2)	100.0
Hangzhou city	2,342 (100.0)	1,515 (71.3)	827 (28.7)	1,515 (71.3)	827 (28.7)	100.0
Wenzhou city	2,504 (100.0)	1,243 (49.6)	1,261 (50.4)	1,243 (49.6)	1,261 (50.4)	100.0
Lishui district	966 (100.0)	771 (79.8)	195 (20.1)	771 (79.8)	195 (20.1)	100.0

Note: Place of conscription is approximately equal to the breakdown by household registration status.

Hangzhou city is the provincial capital, Lishui district is an inland, relatively underdeveloped area.

Sources: Zhejiang Minzheng tongji Nianjian 1989,1994 (Zhejiang Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook) (Hangzhou: Hangzhou Daxue

Chubanshe, 1989,1994), pp. 92-93 (1989), pp. 97-98 (1994), Zhejiang Tongji Nianjian 1990,1995 (Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook)

(Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe), pp. 41-46 (1990), pp. 38-39 (1995).

Table 2. The Number and Characteristics of Drafted Soldiers in Shandong Province (1954-1987)

	Total number of drafted soldiers	Ratio of Party and Communist Youth League members (%)	Class status (%)		Educational background (%)	
			Poor and hired	Workers	Middle school	High school
1954	84,828	46.2	99.5	.	.	.
1955	101,910	66.7	90.0	.	.	.
1956	28,006	67.5	98.0	.	5.5	.
1957	30,002	36.2	99.9	.	.	.
1958	72,172	38.4	66.4	.	.	.
1959	57,562
1960	34,206	32.3	67.6	.	18.7	.
1961	32,582	28.7	55.3	.	60.0	.
1962	40,777	50.1	.	98.2	.	.
1963	55,761	42.9	70.0	7.9	.	.
1964	117,229	59.7	89.8	.	.	.
1965	86,852	66.5	86.5	.	.	.
1966	0
1967	0
1968	130,057	45.0	86.0	.	33.5	.
1969	248,467	.	85.9	.	35.4	.
1970	164,685	16.1	90.4	.	46.2	.
1971	0
1972	173,956	42.0	82.0	.	61.0	.
1973	39,999	44.0	85.0	.	35.4	.
1974	100,000	41.7	85.7	.	.	.
1975	100,000
1976	200,000	50.9	82.7	.	88.7	.
1977	94,000
1978	201,977	44.7	80.0	.	95.3	.
1979	90,000	34.5	.	.	98.6	.
1980	80,738	29.2	.	.	51.7	48.3
1981	87,409	27.3	.	.	61.0	39.0
1982	69,000
1983	74,992	27.6	.	.	79.8	23.2
1984	69,910	27.2	.	.	100.0	.
1985	43,070	33.7	.	.	78.3	21.7
1986
1987

Sources: Shandong-sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), Shandong-shengzhi: Junshi-zhi (Gazetteer of Shandong Province: Military) (Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 186-188, Shandong sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (ed.), Shandong-shengzhi: Minzheng-zhi (Gazetteer of Shandong Province: Civil Affairs) Jinan: Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), p. 110.

Table 3. The professional careers of peasant entrepreneurs
(Ratio of those who have specific professional careers listed)

a) Total(by scale of business)		(%)	
Career history	Owner of individual business	Private enterprise manager	Total
Soldier (military service)	3.6	7.2	3.8
Village cadre	10.7	32.6	11.6
Administrative position inTVE	1.6	15.1	2.2
Worker of TVE	4.3	10.1	4.5
Job experiences in outside the home vil	9.2	13.3	9.4
	(n= 30,361)	(n= 1,367)	(n= 31,728)

b) Private enteprise managers by age group		(%)			
Career history	Under 35	35--under 45	45--under 55 or over	Total	
Soldier (military service)	7.7	6.9	6.2	12.9	7.2
Village cadre	12	33.7	51.5	60	32.6
Administrative position in TVE	11.7	15.6	18.2	17.1	15.1
Worker in TVE	14.3	10.6	4.4	4.3	10.1
Job experiences outside the home villa	18.4	13.7	6.2	5.7	13.3
	(n= 392)	(n= 621)	(n= 274)	(n= 70)	(n= 1,367)

Note: If one person has multiple careers, it is assumed that all of them are counted.
An enterprise with more than 8 employees is counted as a private enterprise, while an individual business is considered to be smaller than that. The total of (B) include 10 samples with uncertain age.

Source: Guojia Tizhi-gaige Weiyuanhui and Guojia Gongshang-ju (eds.), Zhongguo Geti Siying Jingji Diaocha (Individual and Private Economy in China) (Beijing: Junshi-yiwen Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 127, 346-347, 353-354.

Table 4. Professional career formations of peasant entrepreneurs in Gangnan County, Wenzhou City

ID	Age	Education	Present business	Career formation				
				1970-1974	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-
1	45	College	Piping equipment manufacturing and installation	Fishing machine factory	Fishing machine factory	Fishing machine factory	Piping equipment manufacturing from 1984. Established present factory in 1986	
2	43	Primary school	Printing material manufacturing		Stationary factory	Soda water manufacturing		Present business since 1990
3	41	Primary school	Printing (label etc.)	Military service (in Anhui)	Plastic processing			Present business since 1992
4	40	Middle school	Plastic bag manufacturing	Military service (in Zhejiang)	Metal goods sales	Various goods purchase/sale		Present business since 1992
5	39	Primary school	Metal processing (metal etc.)	Military service	Commerce			Present business since 1992
6	38	Middle school	Plastic bag manufacturing		Printing	Plastic bag manufacturing		Present business since 1992
7	37	Middle school	Manufacturing (glue etc.)		Lumber purchase and sale	Equipment repairing	Present business since 1986	
8	37	Middle school	Ink and printing material manufacturing			Establish metal/plastic processing factory		Present factory since 1992
9	37	High school	Metal/accessory manufacturing		Military service	Vice secretary of village branch of party. present business since 1983		
10	33	Middle school	Printing			Present business since 1983		Present business since 1993
11	30	Middle school	Plastic bag manufacturing					
12	30	Middle school	Printing (label etc.)			Various goods purchase/sale	Established present factory in 1988	
13	30	High school	Manufacturing (printing and wrapping materials etc.)				Established printing factory	Present business since 1992
14	25	Middle school	Manufacturing (wrapping paper, paper boxes)				County owned wrapping paper factory	Contract for managing the factory since 1991
15	25	Middle school	Printing (plastic surface)				Farming	Present business since 1993
16	23	Middle school	Manufacturing (enameled daily necessities)				Various goods purchase/sale	Present business since 1990
17	23	Middle school	Metal and plastic decorative processing				County owned decorative processing factory	Established present factory since 1992

Source: Factory survey in Gangnan County (1993) by the author.

Table 5. Expectation of peasants for children
 ("Regular Rural Observation Station" from the end of 1987 to early 1988)

	(%)
Enter universities and become state cadres	42.5
Become workers	17.0
Enter the PLA	10.5
Become teachers	10.1
Begin individual businesses	9.9
Others	10.0
Total	100.0
	(n= 10,794)

Source: Zhonggongzhongyang Zhengce Yanjiushi and Nongyebu
 Nongcun Gudingguanchadian Bangongshi (eds.), Quanguo Nongcun
 Shehuijingji Dianxing Shuju Huibian (Summary of Data at Regular
 Rural Observation Station) (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Danxiao
 Chubanshe.


Table 6. Logit Estimation of the Rural Youths' Attitude toward the PLA
 (male out-migrant workers in foreign invested factory in Zhujiang Delta)

Dependent Variable: either wishing(=1) or not wishing(=0) to become a PLA soldier

Age	-0.266 (-3.160)***
Education	-0.735 (-1.691)*
Location	0.015
(distance from home village to county seat)	(1.480)
Conctant	8.517 (3.751)***
Pseudo-R square	0.127
Log likelihood	-53.448

Notes: The values in parentheses are z-statistics. *** means significant at 1% level,
 ** means significant at 5% level, and * means significant at 10% level.

Figure 1 Expectation for Children (Results of Correspondence Analysis)
Dimension1 and Dimension2






Figure 1. (Appendix) Variables used in the Correspondence Analysis

Variable	Value level	Abbreviations in Figure 1
Age group	Over 40/under 40	Old/Young
Education	Middle school or over/primary school or under	High_edu./Low_edu.
Satisfaction in agriculture	Satisfied/not satisfied	Satisf./Not_satisf.
Attitude toward non-farm economic activities	Positive/not positive or negative	Positive/Negative
Urban-orientation	Wish to live in urban area/Do not wish to live in urban area	Urban/Rural
Daily activity domain	Over the administrative village/within the administrative village	Wide/Narrow
Household income structure	Divided by 2 groups in the order of non-farm income ratio(non-farm income/total household income)	Non_agri./Agri.
Expectation for children	Farming/engineer, technician/township and village cadre/the PLA/others	Farming/Engineer/Cadre/PLA/Others
Village Dummy	Anqiu/Yongxing/Tianchang	AQ/YX/TC